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The	Arctic	Conundrum	as	Geopoetics:	Russian	Politics	at	the	North	Pole				 The	article	develops	a	geopoetic	approach	to	Arctic	politics.	It	is	based	on	the	observation	that	conventional	approaches	that	explain	state	behaviour	in	terms	of	gains	for	security	and	wealth	do	not	resonate	with	empirical	observations,	which	highlight	cooperation	as	well	as	the	uncertainty	of	returns	to	the	billions	of	dollars	of	investment	that	states	are	undertaking	in	the	region.	Something	else	therefore	has	to	account	for	the	plausibility	of	policies.		Geopoetics	focuses	on	the	cultural	roots	and	their	cognitive-emotional	dimension,	on	the	basis	of	which	claims	to	the	Arctic	and	related	policies	resonate	with	a	broader	audience.	The	article	particularly	analyses	Russian	politics,	arguing	that	policies	have	their	foundation	in	a	utopian	ideal	of	Soviet	socialist	realism	that	was	widely	popularised	in	the	1920s	and	later	decades.	Introducing	the	concept	of	topos	as	a	hermeneutic	tool,	the	article	highlights	that	three	features	stand	out	that	interweave	into	a	coherent	imaginary	of	the	Arctic:	first,	the	heroic	explorer	embodying	certain	values;	second,	the	conquest	of	vast	space	of	nature;	and	third,	the	role	of	science	and	technology.	Analysts	would	do	well	to	bear	in	mind	how	the	Arctic	becomes	intelligible	when	commenting	on	policies.					 The	Arctic	was	once	referred	to	as	the	last	unmanaged	frontier	of	humanity	(Bloomfield,	1981).	Yet	due	to	climate	change	this	frontier	is	shifting	and	it	is	no	longer	unmanaged.	The	Arctic	is	the	world’s	region	that	is	most	severely	affected	by	climate	change	with	temperatures	rising	four	times	faster	than	elsewhere	(Bintanja	&	van	der	Linden,	2013).	Changes	to	the	ecosystem	bear	consequences	for	species	as	well	as	humans	living	in	the	region.	While	some	species	are	in	danger	of	extinction,	such	as	the	Polar	Bear,	fish	hitherto	unknown	in	these	latitudes	thrive	in	warmer	waters	and	replace	other	kinds	(CAFF,	2017).	The	changing	flora	and	fauna	also	impacts	on	indigenous	people’s	ways	of	life	where	these	are	closely	connected	to	the	ecosystem	(Arctic	Council,	2013),	while	receding	sea	ice	potentially	opens	up	new	waterways	along	the	Northwest	and	Northeast	Passage,	also	making	subsoil	gas	and	oil	resources	better	accessible	(Melia,	Haines	&	Hawkins,	2016).	Over	the	course	of	the	last	two	decades	Arctic	countries1	have	invested	hundreds	of	billions	of	Dollars	in	infrastructure	projects	that	include	roads,	railway	lines,	ports,	ice-breaker	capacity,	energy	as	well	as	faster	internet	connections	(Conley,	2013;	Staalesen,	2016).	At	the	same	time,	there	has	been	a	considerable	militarisation	of	the	Arctic,	with	more	troops	stationed	in	the	area	as	well	as	newly-built	vessels	and	army	bases	(Depledge,	2015;	Singh,	2013).	At	the	same	time,	Russia,	Canada	and	Denmark	have	submitted	applications	to	the	United	Nations	Committee	on	the	Limits	of	the	Continental	Shelf	to	extend	the	boundaries	of	their																																																									1	These	are:	Canada,	Denmark/Greenland,	Norway,	the	United	States,	and	Russia	–	the	so-called	Arctic	–	plus	Finland,	Iceland,	and	Sweden,	so	so-called	Arctic-8.	
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respective	exclusive	economic	zones,	albeit	with	contradictory	and	overlapping	claims	(BBC,	2014;	McKie,	2016).	Russia	also	seemed	to	pursue	this	goal	outside	the	administrative	framework	of	the	UN	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	when	an	expedition	of	submarines	led	by	Duma	member	and	Arctic	explorer	Artur	Chilingarov	planted	a	flag	on	the	ocean	floor	at	the	North	Pole	in	August	2007.	This	move	was	rejected	by	the	Canadian	foreign	minister	as	politics	from	the	15th	Century	(Parfitt,	2007).		Against	this	background	it	becomes	clear	that	established	ways	of	human	interaction	are	subject	to	change.	The	examples	raise	the	central	question	of	this	article,	namely	what	is	the	nature	of	this	interaction	and	how	can	it	be	understood?	Realist	perspectives	frame	the	changing	landscape	of	the	Arctic	as	a	question	of	national	security	(Borgerson,	2008;	Denmark,	2017;	Huebert,	2013;	Huebert	et	al.,	2012;	UK	Parliament,	2016).	This	perspective	highlights	the	worth	of	a	potential	rush	for	resources	combined	with	a	claim	to	territory.	The	approach	is	based	on	the	notion	that	states’	raison	d’être	is	their	own	survival	and	their	only	obligation	is	towards	themselves	and	their	people	(Kissinger,	1977).	Yet	a	decade	after	the	flag-planting	incident,	much	has	been	written	about	the	uncertainty	of	resources	actually	existing	(Keil,	2014),	let	alone	being	accessible	for	commercial	exploitation	(Atlantic	Council,	2017;	Baev,	2017).	Well-functioning	cooperative	practices	in	the	Arctic	Council	and/or	within	the	confines	of	international	law	suggest	that	realist	scenarios	struggle	to	survive	a	reality	check.2	As	an	alternative	to	realist	explanations,	human	and	environmental	security	approaches	have	made	convincing	cases	for	a	change	of	perspective	(Hoogensen	Gjørv	et	al.,	2014).	Their	focus	explicitly	shifts	away	from	the	state	as	the	main	referent	object	of	security	politics	and	towards	individual	human	beings,	or	abstract	entities,	such	as	the	environment	or	the	economy	(Owen,	2004;	Suhrke,	1999).	It	is	argued	that	the	perspective	helps	to	unsettle	conventional	lenses	and	provide	a	bottom-up	perspective	on	security	(Hoogensen	&	Stuvøy,	2006).	Yet,	notwithstanding	the	many	ways	in	which	local	projects	empower	indigenous	groups	and	general	population	in	the	region	(Śmieszek,	Stępień	&	Kankaanpää,	2017),	while	such	a	broadened	understanding	of	security	is	fruitful,	it	should	not	be	underestimated	that	states	remain	powerful	actors	of	global	politics	(Gaskarth,	2015)	which	can	significantly	impact	on	the	lives	of																																																									2	For	a	possible	future	scenario,	see	statements	by	Klaus	Dodds	and	Caroline	Kennedy-Pipe	in	the	2017	Arctic	Defence	Inquiry	(House	of	Commons,	2017a).	
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individuals.	This	assessment	leaves	us	with	a	conundrum	according	to	which	state	policies	do	not	appear	plausible,	yet	there	is	undoubtedly	considerable	motivation	to	engage	in	the	Arctic	and	in	various	policy	projects	worth	billions	of	Dollars.	In	light	of	the	diagnosed	blind	spot	of	human	security	perspectives	it	should	be	clear	that	the	analytical	pendulum	cannot	simply	swing	back	and	assume	a	state	centric	approach.		The	first	aim	of	the	article	is	therefore	to	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	what	is	happening	in	the	Arctic	by	developing	an	alternative	explanatory	protocol	that	focuses	not	on	geopolitics,	but	rather	on	geopoetics	(Mitchell,	2000).	The	article	develops	geopoetics	as	a	hermeneutic	approach	that	looks	at	how	spaces	such	as	the	Arctic	become	meaningful,	what	Balasopoulos	calls	the	‘textuality	of	geography’,	while	also	taking	into	account	“the	set	of	localizing	and	particularizing	constraints	that	act	upon	(such	representations)”,	which	is	referred	to	as	the	‘geography	of	textuality’	(Balasopoulos,	2008:	9).3	The	approach	decomposes	the	state	into	the	cultural	practices	through	which	it	comes	to	life,	particularly	the	actions	of	people	who	draw	on	and	create	meaning	(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2010).	In	a	geopoetics	approach,	culture	is	regarded	as	a	process	rather	than	object		–	a	reservoir	of	meanings	that	may	be	stored	and	transmitted	through	different	media,	artefacts	or	objects,	but	which	requires	instantiation	in	practice	to	become	meaningful	(Hansen-Magnusson	&	Wiener,	2010).	These	instantiations	are	embodied	experiences	that	have	a	strongly	emotional	component	(Crawford,	2014;	Fierke,	2014;	Mercer,	2014)	and	are	key	to	how	actors	make	sense	of	themselves	and	others	(Lebow,	2012;	Onuf,	2013),	including	the	space	in	which	they	exist	(Pain,	2009).	Geopolitics	and	related	policies	are	therefore	the	result	of	geopoetics	–	geopoetics	precedes	geopolitics.	The	article	applies	the	geopoetic	framework	to	Russian	Arctic	politics	as	these	have	been	subject	of	the	vast	majority	of	commentaries	by	European	and	North	American	scholars	in	recent	years,	especially	in	the	wake	of	the	2007	flag-planting	(Dodds,	2010).	The	second	aim	of	the	article	is	to	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	this	particular	case.	Through	its	framework,	geopoetics	portrays	the	Arctic	as	a	space	of	cultural-political	practice.	Based	on	an	analysis	of	primary	cultural	resources,	especially	film	and	literature,	as	well	as	secondary	resources,	the	article	reconstructs	three	central	topoi	that	help	understand	and	explain	Russia’s	politics	in	the	Arctic.	The	argument	put	forward	holds	that	Russian	politics	in	the	Arctic	in	the	early	21st	Century	reveals	a																																																									3	Critical	geographers	have	argued	similarly	for	a	transition	from	a	focus	on	the	survival	of	states	towards	one	on	assumptions,	practices	and	representations	(Dodds,	Kuus	&	Sharp,	2013:	6).	
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striking	resemblance	to	a	utopia	of	the	early	Soviet	empire	in	which	the	Arctic	played	a	central	role	in	politics	of	state-building.	These	politics	fed	on	notions	of	honour	and	standing,	centring	particularly	on,	first,	heroism,	second,	exploring,	conquering	and	civilizing	nature,	as	well	as,	third,	on	the	role	of	science	and	technology.	It	is	held	that	the	geopoetics	dimension	of	these	topoi	provides	sufficient	rationality	to	pursue	policies	that	do	not	make	sense	from	the	perspective	of	conventional	analyses.	With	a	view	to	the	broader	literature	on	Arctic	politics,	ultimately	I	argue	that	a	better	understanding	of	what	it	is	that	states	do,	and	how	they	do	it,	may	benefit	human	security	perspectives,	too.	The	remainder	of	the	article	is	organised	as	follows.	In	the	following	section	I	review	the	conundrum	of	Arctic	politics	that	emanates	from	interest-based	explanations.	Not	only	are	states	engaged	in	considerable	efforts	to	cooperate	on	a	wide	range	of	issues,	there	is	also	empirical	evidence	that	questions	the	rationality	to	invest	in	Arctic	infrastructure	and	resource	extraction	for	the	sake	of	state’s	survival	and	well-being.	Yet	still	investments	are	being	made,	which	suggest	that	there	could	be	other	factors	that	motivate	policies.	While	some	research	has	focused	on	Russian	identity,	it	did	not	do	so	with	a	view	to	the	Arctic	–	and	vice	versa.	On	the	basis	that	policies	might	be	motivated	by	a	pursuit	for	standing	and	honour,	the	article	then	moves	on	to	explain	how	such	policies	are	part	of	geopoetics.	The	following	section	explains	the	methodological	focus	on	topoi	as	the	means	through	which	we	can	understand	how	specific	policies	represent	a	broader	context	of	national	politics	in	the	Arctic.	Three	topoi	are	particularly	significant	and	presented	in	detail	in	the	analytical	section.	They	specify	through	whom,	what,	and	how	the	Arctic	becomes	significant	from	a	Russian	perspective.	The	conclusion	highlights	that	Arctic	policies	are	a	utopian	cognitive-emotional	project	that	needs	to	be	reckoned	with	when	commenting	on	contemporary	politics.			
The	Arctic	Conundrum:	the	Significance	of	Signalling	Standing	
	This	section	argues	that	there	are	good	reasons	to	look	beyond	explanations	that	champion	security	and	wealth	as	primary	motivations	for	Russia’s	Arctic	pursuits.	Questions	of	honour	and	standing,	it	has	been	shown,	may	be	similarly,	if	not	more	important	for	foreign	policies	and	studies	are	showing	that	Russia	sees	itself	as	a	great	power.	Yet	this	insight	on	its	own	does	not	explain	how	policies	become	significant	for	a	
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given	audience.	The	conclusion	therefore	holds	that	we	need	to	take	a	look	at	the	way	in	which	connections	to	an	audience	are	established.			
The	Mismatch	between	Theory	and	Practice	
	The	Arctic	conundrum	arises	from	the	many	apparent	contradictions	between	empirical	evidence	and	theoretical	accounts	of	policies	that	attempt	to	put	them	into	perspective.	Interest-based	explanations	of	Russia’s	Arctic	policy	have	framed	the	practices	described	at	the	beginning	of	this	article	in	terms	of	sovereignty	and	security	gains	along	the	lines	of	realist	explanations	(Borgerson,	2008;	Huebert	et	al.,	2012;	Piskunova,	2010;	Singh,	2007).	Accordingly	policies	strive	to	widen	states’	influence	over	their	own	and	the	yet-unclaimed	territory	and	its	potential	resources.	Headlines	regarding	militarization	in	the	Arctic	have	frequently	led	commentary	along	similar	lines	or	argumentation	(Huebert,	2013).	Following	the	realist	account	of	balance-of-power	dynamics,	every	move	to	widen	influence	is	regarded	as	a	step	towards	eventual	escalation	(Waltz,	1979).		Of	course,	it	is	difficult	to	foresee	whether	any	of	these	scenarios	might	not	come	true	at	some	point	(House	of	Commons,	2017b;	Human	Security	Centre,	2017;	Kraska	&	Fahey,	2017)	and	perhaps	it	is	a	sign	of	diligence	to	take	into	account	hypotheticals.	Yet,	it	is	a	well-known	problem	that	predictions	are	difficult	to	make,	especially	when	they	concern	the	future.	For	the	time	being,	retrospective	analyses	and	the	current	state	of	the	art	highlight	the	amicable	cooperation	in	the	Arctic	Council	and	its	achievements	in	fostering	scientific	cooperation,	for	instance,	on	the	extent	and	effect	of	climate	change	in	the	area	(Bloom,	1999;	Humrich,	2013;	Knecht,	2016;	Koivurova,	2010;	Koivurova,	Keskitalo	&	Bankes,	2009;	Larsen	&	Fondahl,	2014;	Pedersen,	2012).	From	the	perspective	of	international	law,	there	is	very	little	to	worry	about	as	state	action	takes	place	in	the	confines	of	the	nomos	set	by	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(Byers,	2013;	Wood-Donnelly,	2013).	The	existence	of	potential	oil	and	gas	resources	identified	by	the	US	Geological	Survey	in	2008	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	actually	existing	stocks	(Keil,	2014).	Even	so,	climatic	conditions	and	the	currently	low	price	for	fossil	fuels	on	the	global	market	put	into	doubt	whether	the	resources	could	be	accessed	at	all	and	at	economically	viable	costs	(Atlantic	Council,	2017;	Baev,	2017).	Notwithstanding	future	changes	to	the	current	trajectory,	there	is	very	little	empirical	evidence	to	support	the	premises	of	realist	explanations	that	focus	on	survival	and	resource	acquisition	to	
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explain	state	behaviour	(Brosnan,	Leschine	&	Miles,	2011;	Exner-Pirot,	2012;	Laruelle,	2014;	Wilson,	2016).	Yet,	the	attempt	to	understand	Arctic	politics	does	not	need	to	be	abandoned	in	light	of	this	conclusion.	Foreign	policy	can	be	based	on	motivations	other	than	survival	or	wealth.	It	has	been	shown	that	a	pursuit	of	honour	and	standing	quite	often	yields	considerable	analytical	sway	regarding	the	explanation	of	war	and	conflict	(Lebow,	2008).	It	is	worth	bearing	this	in	mind	when	we	look	at	alternative	explanations	for	Russia’s	Arctic	policy	because	the	flag-planting	in	2007	is	often	referred	to	as	primarily	symbolic	and	directed	at	a	domestic	audience	(Baev,	2017;	Laruelle,	2014)	as	if	this	observation	was	insignificant	for	a	potential	trajectory	of	conflict.	Yet,	symbolic	politics	are	no	less	real	than	a	pursuit	of	security	and	wealth	because	they	are	central	to	establishing	an	identity	(Lebow,	2012),	and	may	trigger	considerable	domestic	resources	to	influence	the	course	of	state	policy	towards	others	(Crawford,	2014;	Walker,	1993;	Weldes,	1998).	The	question	is,	how	and	why	do	they	become	real	and	significant	in	the	first	place.			
Great	Power	Identity	and	Standing	
	Taking	a	historical	approach	that	is	consistent	with	the	perspective	of	the	state	as	cultural	practice	introduced	earlier,	Ted	Hopf	(2005)	holds	that	there	are	multiple	Russian	identities	interacting	domestically	and	abroad	which	shape	the	course	of	the	country’s	foreign	policy.	The	different	positions	share	the	common	denominator	that	Russia	is	a	“great	power”,	while	each	positions	holds	different	connotations	on	what	constitutes	such	power	and	what	policies	follow	(Hopf,	2005:	26).	Hopf’s	analysis	of	the	1990s	identifies	a	centrist	discourse	as	dominant,	which	emphasises	family	ties	to	Europe	and	broadly	an	adherence	to	international	norms	which	makes	the	issue-specific	cooperation	in	the	Arctic	Council	and	joint	initiatives	such	as	the	search	and	rescue	agreement	plausible	(Exner-Pirot,	2012;	Wood-Donnelly,	2013).	Yet	in	a	twist	of	this	“great	power”	perception,	Iver	Neumann’s	more	recent	study	reveals	how	that	cooperative	position	might	have	shifted	during	the	last	decade	and	a	half	(Neumann,	2017).	He	does,	however	underscore	the	need	to	look	into	aspects	of	standing	and	honour	in	addition	to	security	and	wealth,	based	on	the	observation	that	the	Russian	self-perception	continues	to	be	one	of	a	great	power,	especially	vis-à-vis	Europe.	Akin	to	Hopf,	Neumann	identifies	the	rise	of	a	nationalist,	anti-Westernised	discourse	which	
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emphasised	a	“strong	state	domestically	and	a	great	power	internationally,	with	a	strong,	authoritarian	leader”	(Neumann,	2017:	177).	Both	Hopf’s	and	Neumann’s	study	reveal	the	different	facets	to	Russia’s	perception	as	a	great	power,	which	we	can	take	as	a	heuristic	device	for	further	analysis.	But	as	neither	study	(including	the	chapters	in	Hopf,	2008)	mentions	the	Arctic	in	any	detail,	nor	why	Russia	seems	to	be	selectively	cooperative	and	in	adherence	to	international	law,	they	do	not	provide	an	answer	to	the	particular	questions	of	this	article.	By	contrast,	Maness	and	Valeriano	do	discuss	Arctic	issues	and	with	an	explicit	connection	to	concepts	of	identity	(2015:	26).	They	reach	the	conclusion	that	in	the	
future	conflict	in	the	Arctic	is	unlikely	because	disputes	are	“not	symbolic”	(Maness	&	Valeriano,	2015:	177)	but	rather	tangible	because	they	involve	sharable	commodities,	such	as	fish.	As	further	factors	that	make	conflict	unlike,	they	highlight	that	policies	take	place	in	considerably	remote	locations	in	relation	to	the	capital;	the	infrastructure	and	population	density	is	considerably	thin;	and,	finally,	public	opinion	either	does	not	care	too	much	or	supports	cooperation	in	the	Arctic	Council	or	the	confines	of	international	law.	While	the	usual	caveat	to	future	prediction	should	apply,	contrary	to	their	intended	methodology,	the	chapter	holds	very	little	discussion	of	identity	issues	in	the	Russian	Arctic.	Public	opinion	is	quoted	as	an	indicator	of	the	salience	of	Arctic	politics	but	the	overview	only	provides	data	for	a	particular	point	in	time.	It	does	not	tell	us	whether	the	2011	level	are	high	or	low	historically,	thereby	providing	no	suggestion	whether	Arctic	issues	might	assume	more	prominence	in	the	future.	Similarly,	the	distance	between	the	capital	and	the	Arctic	appears	to	be	a	rather	crude	indicator	of	whatever	“emotional	significance”	(Herd,	2000:	237)	the	Arctic	might	hold	for	the	country.	Yet	coming	to	terms	with	this	‘significance’	seems	paramount	and	the	current	debate	in	the	field	holds	that	next	to	a	pursuit	of	power	as	an	explanation,	identity-based	explanations	should	be	considered	as	well	(Hønneland,	2016:	20).	If	we	take	the	flag-planting	as	a	visible	instantiation	of	Russian	Arctic	politics,	experts	remain	divided	on	what	it	stands	for.	It	has	been	said	that	the	expedition	was	primarily	the	doings	of	Artur	Chilingarov	who	held	strong	convictions	about	Russia’s	role	and	legitimate	claims	to	ownership	in	the	Arctic:	“Overall,	it	is	clear	that	Chilingarov’s	expedition	was	an	impromptu	rather	than	a	calculated	geopolitical	move	but	the	Kremlin	was	quick	to	follow	it	up	with	political	and	security	steps	aimed	at	overtaking	and	dividing	its	dumbfounded	competitors”	(Baev,	2007:	12).	If	this	opinion	holds	explanatory	value	and	the	flag-planting	is	indeed	an	incident	of	public	relations,	questions	remain	regarding	a)	
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the	nature	of	the	public	(who	is	the	audience?),	and	b)	the	quality	of	the	relations	to	the	audience.	While	foreign	policy	experts	seem	divided	on	whether	the	audience	is	domestic	or	international	(compare	Steinberg,	Tasch	&	Gerhard,	2015:	23),	it	may	be	the	case	that	multiple	audiences	were	addressed	at	the	same	time:	“In	addition	to	the	revival	of	Russian	greatness	on	the	international	scene,	the	‘security	first’	variant	is	viewed	as	having	a	more	immediate	domestic	aim:	to	reassert	Russian	patriotism	in	order	to	secure	the	legitimacy	of	the	political	establishment.”	(Hønneland,	2016:	50).		Contrary	to	the	study	presented	by	Maness	and	Valeriano,	then,	this	seems	to	suggest	that	the	Arctic	does	present	a	salient	topic	in	Russian	policy	and	one	that	may	become	important	enough	to	warrant	policies	other	than	diplomatic	ones.	If	we	want	to	arrive	at	a	better	understanding	of	Arctic	politics,	the	discussion	in	this	section	suggests	that	we	should	not	begin	the	inquiry	with	preconceived	concepts	and	assumptions	about	states	intention	but	rather	with	the	ways	in	which	policies	resonate	in	a	particular	cultural	context.			
The	Geopoetics	of	Culture	
	In	order	to	understand	how	questions	of	standing	can	be	posed	in	a	way	that	they	resonate	with	an	audience,	we	need	to	consider	how	it	would	be	possible	to	make	a	connection.	The	debate	in	the	previous	section	underscored	that	we	need	to	take	a	geopoetic	approach	and	address	the	question	of	the	significance	of	Arctic	politics	hermeneutically.	After	all	the	foundational	premise	of	hermeneutics	is	that	understanding	and	significance	are	possible	through	a	“fusion	of	horizons”	(Gadamer,	2004	[1975])	in	which	communicative	interlocutors	develop	a	mutual	understanding	with	the	help	of	shared	cultural	resources.	The	horizon	refers	to	the	pre-existing	perceptions	through	which	one’s	environment	is	rendered	comprehensible,	without	determining	the	outcome.	The	horizon	is	not	merely	cognitive	but	also	emotional.	At	a	state	level,	it	is	on	this	basis	that	decision-making	procedure	are	initiated	and	procedures	are	evoked	(compare	Crawford,	2014:	547).	Although	the	relation	between	geopoetics	and	geopolitics	may	be	mutually	constitutive,	the	latter	cannot	exist	outside	a	supportive	cultural	setting.	This	section	explains	the	methodology	that	follows	from	this	premise	and	how	it	can	be	made	fruitful	for	research.				
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From	Culture	to	Experience	
	Geopoetics	is	a	topological	approach,	which	perceives	the	Arctic	as	a	space	that	socially	constructed	through	meaningful	cultural	practices	(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2010;	Elden,	2013;	Lury,	Parisi	&	Terranova,	2012).	The	perspective	adopted	in	this	article	holds	that	the	Arctic	is	not	constituted	as	an	a	priori	given	that	is	‘out	there’	awaiting	discovery	and	ownership.	Rather,	its	‘discovery’	is	part	and	parcel	of	sense-making	practices	and	knowledge	creation,	as	a	result	of	which	the	Arctic	becomes,	first,	comprehensible	and,	eventually,	tangible.	It	is	in	this	context	that	one	can	consider	questions	of	demarcation	and	territory	which	are	at	the	heart	of	Russian	(and	other	states’)	policies	shift	the	final	frontier	of	humanity	and	manage	life	alongside	it,	to	paraphrase	Bloomfield	(1981).	As	befits	a	hermeneutic	approach,	the	article	develops	its	argument	through	an	interpretive	reconstruction.	It	focuses	on	primary	sources	of	literature	and	film	as	cultural	media	that	establish	‘geographies	of	textuality’	(Balasopoulos,	2008).	They	were	narrowed	down	and	selected	for	further	analysis	following	secondary	sources	that	comprise	historical	and	sociological	accounts	of	Russian	Arctic	politics.	Particular	attention	was	given	to	works	created	during	the	period	of	or	under	the	programmatic	guide	of	Socialist	Realism,	which	developed	not	only	its	idiosyncratic	aesthetic	but	also	focused	on	conveying	the	Soviet	way	of	life	in	a	manner	sanctioned	by	the	state	(McCannon,	1998;	Sarkisova,	2015).	Additional	secondary	sources	from	human	geography,	history,	and	cultural	studies	were	drawn	upon	as	heuristic	devices	to	guide	the	interpretation	of	what	Balasopoulos	refers	to	as	‘textualities	of	geography’.	They	were	assessed	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	which	they	establish	particular	actors	and	identities	as	well	as	their	relations	towards	each	other.		The	analysis	followed	a	narratological	approach	which	zooms	in	on	particular	creations	of	knowledge.	As	the	hermeneutic	philosopher	Richard	Kearney	explains,	such	an	approach	focuses	on	the	“communicative	practice	in	which	someone	(a	narrator)	tells	something	(a	story)	to	someone	(a	narratee)	about	something	(a	real	or	imaginary	world)”	(Kearney,	2002:	5	and	150).	It	requires	the	analyst	to	focus	on	which	actors	feature	in	a	text	or	film,	how	they	are	portrayed,	how	their	relations	are	formed	and	conveyed	and	which	broader	context	they	are	embedded	in.	Each	of	these	points	of	analysis	contribute	to	answering	the	central	question,	i.e.	“how	does	the	Arctic	become	the	subject	of	cognitive-emotional	experience?”		
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Topoi	–	Making	Sense	of	Sense-Making		This	question	and	the	related	heuristics	generated	the	data	for	the	analysis	presented	in	the	following	section.	The	data	is	tied	together	with	the	help	of	the	central	analytical	concepts	of	the	topos	(or	topoi	in	its	plural	form).	Denoting	“place”	in	Greek,	the	term	refers	to	literary	conventions,	formula	or	themes	as	well	as	rhetorical	commonplaces.4	It	has	been	used	by	international	relations	scholars	but	not	in	a	way	that	was	accompanied	by	systematic	exploration	and	development	(Bigo	&	Walker,	2007;	Kornprobst,	2007;	Koslowski,	1999;	Neumann,	2001).	On	the	basis	of	this	precedent,	the	article	employs	creative	leeway	and	expands	on	Friedrich	Kratochwil’s	explanation	of	the	term.	Kratochwil	explains	topoi	as		“commonplaces	[…which	not	only]	establish	‘starting-points’	for	arguments,	but	also	locate	the	issue	of	a	debate	in	a	substantive	set	of	common	understandings	that	provide	for	the	crucial	connections	within	the	structure	of	an	argument.”	(Kratochwil,	1989:	220)	While	the	reference	to	‘structure	of	an	argument’	refers	to	the	rhetorical	connotation	of	topos,5	the	article	applies	a	broader,	less	literal	understanding	that	is	not	confined	to	the	dialogic	exchange	of	an	argument.	Rather,	the	article	assumes	that	geopoetics	is	part	of	establishing	such	common	understandings	through	which	the	Arctic	becomes	part	of	geopolitical	contention.	Following	the	premise	that	geopoetics	precedes	geopolitics,	the	Arctic	and	related	policies	exist	in	the	form	of	argumentative	exchange,	which	are	created,	embodied	and	advanced	through	various	cultural	forms	and	interactions.	These	practices	establish	a	web	of	meaning	(Geertz,	1973)	that	may	be	subject	to	change	over	time.	Through	the	links	between	different	topoi,	the	web	centres	on	deeply	political	questions	of	possession,	ownership,	resource	allocation	and	distribution,	as	well	as	questions	of	justice	and	access.	Analytically,	 the	 concept	 of	 topos	 thus	 lends	 itself	 to	 a	 spatial	 understanding	 of	discourse	(Holzscheiter,	2014)	in	which	the	web	of	meaning	resembles	an	“ancient	city:	a	maze	of	 little	 streets	and	squares,	of	old	and	new	houses,	of	houses	with	extensions	from	 various	 periods,	 and	 all	 this	 surrounded	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	 new	 suburbs	 with																																																									4	Compare	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	entry	for	“topos”:	http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/203433?redirectedFrom=topos#eid	5	Regarding	the	structure	of	an	argument,	three	common	forms	of	topoi	are	that	of	objection	to	a	premise	or	prior	statement,	of	consequence	regarding	the	alleged	cause-effect	relations	and	of	authority	regarding	singular	practices	or	someone’s	trustworthiness,	suggesting	ulterior	motives. 
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straight	and	regular	streets	and	uniform	houses”	(Wittgenstein,	2009	[1953]:	para	18).	Reconstructing	 topoi	 resembles	 a	 way	 of	 mapping	 such	 an	 ancient	 city.	 According	 to	John	Ruggie,	 this	 reconstruction	 involves	 two	 “’orders’	 of	 information:	 the	 descriptive	and	 the	 configurative”	 (Ruggie,	 1995:	 94).	 The	 descriptive	 order	 refers	 to	 a	 chain	 of	events	 as	 they	 unfolded	 over	 time,	 which	 are	 interpreted	 through	 a	 kind	 of	 thick	description	(Geertz,	1973).	The	configurative	order	ties	these	descriptions	together	and	assembles	 them	 into	 that	 Polkinghorne	 (1988)	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘coherence	 structure’	 or	‘interpretive	gestalt’.		The	 analyst	 thus	 needs	 to	 understand	 that	 policies	 and	 representation	 in	 film,	literature	and	other	media	are	an	attempt	to	transform	“haphazard	happenings	(…)	into	story,	 and	 thus	 (…to	 make	 them)	 memorable	 over	 time.	 This	 becoming	 historical	involves	 a	 transition	 from	 the	 flux	 of	 events	 into	 a	 meaningful	 social	 or	 political	community.”	 (Kearney,	 2002:	 3)	Reconstructing	 topoi	means	presenting	 a	 second	 and	third	order	interpretation	(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2006;	Lee	et	al.,	2015)	in	which	I	make	sense	of	others’	sense-making.	Topoi	enable	us	to	understand	how	Russian	politics	make	the	Arctic	intelligible	and,	as	a	consequence,	subject	to	particular	policies.		
 
Arctic Topoi: Heroism, Nature and Technology 
 
Three topoi stand out from the analysis which form the core element of how the Arctic 
becomes a comprehensible space and through which policies resonate with a domestic 
audience. The topoi address questions of who, what and how, i.e. the characteristics and main 
attributes of the main character or force at the centre of Arctic action; the object to which the 
main character’s action relates; and the nature of these relations. My argument in the 
following passages holds that Russia’s politics in the Arctic today appears plausible when 
considered as a performative re-enactment of a utopian vision that was prevalent in the early 
days of the Soviet Union. Utopias portray unitary, perfect worlds and are the source of 
identity and moral guidance (Lebow, 2012: 52ff.). Typically, they are  
“forward looking and motivated by reformist, even revolutionary projects. (…Unlike 
the pessimistic depiction of Golden Ages, their) starting assumption (is) that people 
can make the future better than the present. Utopias are offered as model societies in 
which individual happiness and collective harmony are achieved by means of 
institutions and practices that rest on and reinforce what their authors depict as 
universal human traits and aspirations.” (Lebow, 2012: 62). A 
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As will become plain, Russian Arctic politics evolves around (1) the heroic explorer, (2) 
who overcomes the adversities of nature, while (3) making use of the latest developments in 
the realm of science and technology. 
 
 
The Heroic Explorer 
 
The key actor in the utopian vision of a Soviet Arctic is the heroic explorer. 
Predominantly, but not exclusively, a male character, the boundaries between fiction and real 
life are blurred as actual expeditions were represented in literature and film, while the latter 
media had a constitutive effect on explorers’ longing to push the boundaries of knowledge. 
Explorers “became celebrities of the first magnitude, and their widespread appeal made the 
Arctic a central, even definitive, feature of Stalinist mass culture and propaganda” 
(McCannon, 1997: 347). Of the many examples I could use, I will focus particularly on three 
figures who stand out in the early days of Soviet exploration. Their biographies show how 
much exploration of the Arctic is intertwined with state interest and administration. Their 
conduct in real life was expected to resemble particular virtues, and was portrayed 
accordingly on film when turned into story. The lines between fiction and reality were further 
blurred when heroes on screen, not necessarily explorers but medieval knights, were treated to 
similar victory parades as were explorers upon their return from the Arctic. 
A central figure of the heroic explorer topos is Otto Yulyevich Shmidt, a mathematician-
turned-explorer who led several excursions into Arctic waters during the 1930s. He became 
famous for exploring the Northern Sea Route with the icebreakers Sibiryakov and Chelyuskin 
in 1932 and 1933/34, respectively. Particularly the first expedition was noticeable in that it 
was achieved in one navigation rather than during two summers. This achievement 
highlighted the potential use of the route and Schmidt subsequently headed the Chief 
Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (shortened to Glavsemorput) until his dismissal in 
1939. He expanded the operation of the directorate to stretch from the White Sea to the 
Bering Strait and become known as the Ice Commissar (Josephson, 2014: 69). During this 
time he was in charge of organising the so-called SP-1 mission, which is named after the 
Russian words for North Pole. SP-1 was a manned ice station that drifted on an ice floe for 
nine months. In Shmidt we meet the explorer who does not merely venture into the wild for 
the sake of personal honour but who has a national mission to fulfil. In light of his 
achievements, it is also clear that the Northern Sea Route is not merely of strategic or 
economic importance to Russia today, as some commentators hold (Lajeunesse, 2017). 
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Despite the uncertainty about returns to investment, money spent on developing the 
infrastructure appears sensible in light of the emotional significance of the route. 
Following Shmidt as head of the Glavsemorput was Ivan Papanin who had been the 
commander on the SP-1 ice floe. He received the title Hero of the Soviet Union along with the 
other members of the expedition, and once more in 1940 when he was in charge of 
coordinating rescue efforts for the iceabreaker Sedov. As a high-ranking bureaucrat he sought 
to develop further the infrastructure around the Northern Sea Route, claiming that it would be 
a “powerful means for the development of the productive forces of the Far North and for the 
strengthening of the defenses of the Union." (quoted in Zenzinov, 1944: 70) His achievement 
were popularised in a series of films whose titles translate as At the North Pole!, We 
conquered the North Pole! and Papanin’s Team (Sarkisova, 2017). 
Another explorer/hero was Valery Chkalov, a favourite of Stalin and indeed widely 
admired in the Soviet public. Chkalov was probably the most widely recognised pilot next to 
Mikhail Vodopyanov, who had landed on the North Pole to supply construction material for 
SP-1, and was also one of seven pilots involved in rescuing Otto Shmidt and the crew of the 
Chelyuskin when they ran aground in 1934. Their and other pilots’ popularity is a result of the 
enormous importance Stalin’s state sought to bestow on the profession (Palmer, 2005). 
Chkalov was the first pilot to fly over the North Pole during a world-record setting non-stop 
flight over 63 hours from Moscow to Vancouver, but fatally crashed under unknown, if not 
dubious circumstances in 1938 (McCannon, 1997: 356). His demise was widely mourned: 
“Upon Chkalov’s death, poet Alexander Tvardorsky wrote the following eulogy of the fallen 
pilot: ‘We loved him so much that he seemed to belong to each of our lives, as if each of us 
had drunk with him, eaten with him, flown with him.’” (quoted in McCannon, 1998: 134). In 
1941, shortly after his death, his life story was turned into a film. 
Noticeably, it is not just what the explorers do but also how they achieve their goal and 
conduct themselves. The Soviet explorer-as-hero is not just brave and successful but also 
moral, building on the virtues of spontaneity and consciousness that Marx bestowed on the 
working class on its way to the revolution (Clark, 1981: 15-24). For some commentators, Otto 
Shmidt best embodied these ultimate character traits propagated by Socialist Realism, which 
focussed on virtuous heroism comprising strength and boldness as well as traits of chivalry. 
An example is delivered in Shmidt’s writing when he claims, "(W)e in the Arctic do not chase 
after records (although we break not a few upon the way). We do not look for adventures 
(although we experience them with every step). Our goal is to study the North in order to 
settle it economically ... for the good of the entire USSR." (quoted in McCannon, 1997: 350) 
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Of course, the Soviet public at the time would have been familiar with the theme of 
chivalrous leadership figures, for instance, through films such as civil war hero Chapaev 
(1934, by Georgi and Sergej Vasilyev) and Alexander Nevsky (1938, by Sergey Eisenstein), a 
13th Century prince who saved the Russians from an invasion of crusading German knights. 
Highlighting the natural bond between the people of Russia and the Northern/Arctic 
conditions, in Nevsky the invaders pay the ultimate price by breaking into the ice of a frozen 
lake. Whereas Chapaev dies, even though his mission is successful, Nevsky returns home 
triumphantly to cheering crowds. Further blurring the lines between narrative and practice, the 
hero’s welcome is an honour that Shmidt, Papanin, Chkalov and others experienced in real 
life, too (McCannon, 1998: 78; Skakov, 2012: 119). 
Overall, these examples demonstrate that the explorer is not a ‘lone hero’ character but 
firmly embedded in Soviet society. Whereas Robert Peary’s expedition to the North Pole set 
out to further the honour and prestige of the USA but primarily that of his New York club 
(Peary, 2008: 89) the portrayal of Soviet Arctic heroes as well as their celebration in real life 
demonstrate that the achievements are really meant to signal the society’s achievement. What 
is more, the success is enabled by the benevolence of the country’s leadership: media at the 
time portrayed filial relations fostered by Stalin as the head of state, who assumes a father-like 
role for the country and its heroes. Allegedly, Stalin masterminded the pilots’ missions and 
provided advice on how to execute them successfully (McCannon, 1997: 351).6 There is 
symbiotic relation between the heroic explorer and the state. Explorers’ achievements are part 
of a collective effort, much like the planting of the flag at the North Pole was not exclusively 
Chilingarov’s achievement. Even though it may not have been planned as such, but it 
ultimately came in handy to communicate a broader claim to the ocean floor, the mission had 
to be presented as a collective achievement. After all, the Arctic is the region in which heroic 
achievements take place for the benefit of the collective. 
 
 
Conquering Nature 
 
The second topos that marks the utopian tale of the Arctic centres on nature as the object 
of conquest and domestication. The Arctic is presented as a blank slate, a terra nullius, to 
which various heroes export Soviet/Russian achievements and virtues. Given the hostile 
climate, this is a task that is not undertaken easily but which requires the full amount of heroic 																																																								6	Stalin is repeatedly presented as omniscient and wise, a source of inspiration to the pilots who do their bit to 
uphold this image: Valery Chkalov remarked on the alleged heavenly glow that surrounded Stalin, "Where there 
is Stalin, there is no darkness, only bright light” (quoted in Palmer, 2005: 44). 	
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effort and virtues. This topos describes how adversity brings out the best in characters, how 
hardships can be overcome through h collective efforts, and how conquest of the vast Soviet 
space is a part of a grander utopian vision of Soviet life. 
In the Arctic “blockbuster” (McCannon, 2010: 90) movie The Seven Bold Ones (1937, 
directed by Sergey Gerasimov), a group of five man and one women set out to explore the 
Arctic, when they find a stowaway who becomes the seventh member of the group. The film 
is a parable on Soviet achievement and (its citizens’) character. The Arctic is being claimed 
symbolically by planting flags wherever the explorers venture, while the local Chukchi 
population is won over when they require medical help, which luckily the female surgeon is 
able to provide. Unity between the population at the periphery and the group from the centre 
is restored as the Chukchi help the explorers out of distress caused by avalanches and failing 
rescue missions. 
Similarly, though in the style of a documentary, In the Heart of the Arctic (1955, 
direction by Dmitri Shcherbakov) charts the history of Arctic exploration and then focuses on 
the SP-1 mission. It relives the events as a story in which the explorers tried and failed, such 
as Schmidt’s 1934 attempt to explore the Northern Sea Route, including the successful rescue 
mission by Chkalov and the other pilots. As the film (and Soviet efforts) progress, though, the 
North Pole is eventually successfully conquered (“By now man is the master of this Arctic 
wasteland”, minute 11). Despite all technical difficulties and climatic adversities, nature 
cannot break the social bond between the group and society, expressed in the statement 
“Although they’re far away at the top of the world, the men never feel neglected or cut off 
from their country” (minute 44.44). Once the “noble work of conquering the Arctic” is 
accomplished (minute 49.29), the explorers are treated to a heroes’ welcome to crowds of 
jubilant fellow citizens, including children. These scenes closely resemble the return of the 
hero in Nevsky. 
The theme of nature as an object that is subject to conquering and possessing, the course 
of which lends itself to bring out the most virtuous sides of Soviet people, would have been 
well familiar to the contemporary audience. Dziga Vertov’s A Sixth Part of the World (1926) 
is probably the film that has been most widely viewed. Originally commissioned to advertise 
the State Trade Organization it shows how producers in the countryside and the foreign 
industrial world are linked. It is a black and white silent montage with intertitles that 
celebrates the vastness of the Soviet Union and its achievements in what has been described 
as a “’wholesale’ promotion of the ideological and political foundations of the new regime, 
combining its economic rationale with a progressivist discourse” (Sarkisova, 2007: 26). This 
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is achieved through portraying genuine Soviet achievements but also by juxtaposing and 
repeating these with the decadence and exploitation of Western capitalism, especially the 
shame of colonialism, slavery and the use of black people for entertainment. The intertitles 
address the audience directly and remind them that they own the productive forces of the 
country. Whatever happens in the Soviet Union is shown to be part of a grand and coherent 
strategy for the good of all. Vertov captures this diverse, yet united Soviet Union by 
“ascribing symbolic significance to spaces, identifying them not by their geographical 
locations but by political and economic conditions.” (Sarkisova, 2007: 28) There is a 
particular section in the film that captures the Arctic as part of the empire. Trade brings 
prosperity and progress to remote parts of the country, which is made clear when indigenous 
populations are portrayed in the middle of the film as no longer exploited but actively 
involved in the Soviet empire: “Far away in the Arctic Circle, where the sun does not set for 
half a year and night-time lasts for half the year, the Samoyedes sit motionless and look 
intensely toward the ocean” (minute 47.15) – waiting for the ice breaker to bring 
gramophones and wood in exchange for fur. On the gramophones “they hear Lenin himself” 
(minute 49.05), while the fur is shipped to “capitalist country” and are exchanged for 
“machines for the Soviet Union” (minute 50.57). Unity and progress are ensured through the 
icebreaker Lenin, the image of which is accompanied by the caption, “you break the ice with 
your chest, we pave the way” (minute 62.40).  
In a similar vein, the themes of nature as an obstacle that can be overcome and 
domesticated through Soviet unity and virtues are advanced in the film Salt for Svaneti (1930, 
by Mikhail Kalatozov). The black and white film with intertitles portrays the isolated people 
of Svaneti, inhabitants of a historic, mostly mountainous region in what is nowadays Georgia. 
They live in rather simple conditions and are at risk from the doings of a local robber baron, 
the weather, the land and their devotion to religion. Salt is the resource that is lacking and is 
evoked in a number of metaphors throughout the film that refer to themes such as death, work 
and people themselves. As is typical of a utopia, despite all hardship, the film ends on an 
encouraging tone: bare-chested Soviet workforces arrive in great numbers to fell trees and 
blow through rocks to build a road that connects Svaneti to the rest of the country. The ending 
of the film features a number of quick cuts and montages which show close-ups of explosions 
and men’s chests to suggest the power of communism. The film uses the stylistic device of a 
synecdoche when it shows a flag-draped steam-roller and flag-holding labourers (bare-
chested, of course) that march like armies. Equipped with the symbolic device of conquest 
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(flag), the mise-en-scène suggests that geopolitics is achieved by other means than usual, and 
the film itself becomes message and medium. 
 
 
The Role of Science & Technology 
 
Examples of the central role of science and technology as a third topos that closely 
interacts with the other two have already been mentioned in passing in the previous sections. 
This section therefore focuses on a broader discussion of key characteristics as it is possible to 
identify a close intertextual relation between Soviet politics as well as film and literature. 
Science fiction is the genre in which technology and science can work for the greater 
good of humanity. It is often employed as a comment on the present, literally challenging the 
boundaries of what is taken for granted. Science fiction can be used to create utopian worlds 
to an extent that technological and social change are presented and become part of the cultural 
common sense in which policy gets developed (Weldes, 2003: 12). While the course of 
history showed that the attempt by Soviet communism to turn the Marxist utopia into reality 
led to a dystopian nightmare (Lebow, 2012: 42), this development could not be foreseen in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Accordingly, there are plenty examples through which we can come to 
see the geopoetic dimension of Soviet approaches to science and technology. 
Like the optimism portrayed in the novels of Jules Verne, Soviet film and literature 
knows of utopian examples that tie together the topoi of heroic exploration, mastering of 
nature and technology. One example in point is the 1935 film The Space Voyage by Vasili 
Zhuravlov. The story is set in Moscow of 1946, and the famous astrophysicist Sedych has 
decided to fly to the moon, yet the officials do not want to risk the life of an ageing national 
hero. Defying official orders he gets together with his rival’s female assistant and younger 
brother and the trio manages to get on board of the space ship, demonstrating that in Soviet 
society everyone can be a hero. Once it is too late to stop the space ship, the country unites 
behind them, making their personal mission a national one. In the course of the mission the 
three literally take possession of the moon in a flag planting ceremony (minute 38.28), while 
the Soviet public is delighted when they manage to send a signal back to Earth, which is a 
huge “USSR” projected onto the moon’s surface (minute 52.28). Despite a few mishaps the 
three make it safely back to Earth where they receive the well-known heroes’ welcome. Their 
fate exemplifies that personal heroism is embedded in the greater good of the nation, an 
expectation that real-life cosmonauts would live up to later. Yet, while the spirit of 
comradeship and hard labour go a long way to unite the diversity of the country internally, 
they are hardly the sole means by which this is achieved. Usually unity is literally achieved by 
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physically building connections, such as portrayed in Salt for Svaneti or A Sixth Part of the 
World. Other examples may focus on railroads or electrification, and even virtual ties, such as 
radio transmission.  
In this context the Arctic is a place on the fringes where the heroes not only showcase 
their and the land’s virtues but also Soviet progress in science and technology. True, in The 
Seven Bold Ones technology may cause most of the problem for the explorers, but they are 
ultimately rescued through the use of technology – and have plenty of opportunity in the 
meantime to rely on comradeship and other virtues. The use of icebreakers played a role not 
just on screen but also in real life to make possible the active use of the Northern Sea Route 
(Moe, 2014). Russian engineers were proud to produce the first nuclear powered icebreaker in 
the 1950s and beat the United States to this achievement (Josephson, 2014: 347). Further, as 
described above, the role of pilots and the use of planes were a central component of Soviet 
geopoetry (compare Palmer, 2005). The SP-1 mission epitomized the role of science in the 
discovery and conquest of the Arctic, and the ensuing cinematic portrayal in In the Heart of 
the Arctic further popularized the connection between science and technology and the Arctic. 
The connection between the portrayal of character and technology is not surprising given 
that progress and human betterment through science and technology are a typical topos of 
post-enlightenment thinking in the 19th Century. It can be found in the works of Henri de 
Saint Simon, Auguste Comte and Karl Marx (and, of course, there are the more pessimistic 
positions associated with the Romantic and other counter-Enlightenment writings). Marxism, 
in its Soviet instantiation served “as a state-sponsored ideology to reinforce almost unbounded 
faith in science and technology” (Josephson, 1995: 520). It formed part of the Soviet struggle 
for ‘standing’ (Lebow, 2008) because  
“(t)echnologies are symbols of national achievement. They reflect the omniscient 
power of scientists and engineers. They give legitimacy to political systems. They are 
central to national security strategies. They serve foreign policy through technology 
transfer. They entrance a public, which becomes intoxicated with symbolism and 
overlooks potential dangers to society.” (Josephson, 1995: 521) 
 
The technological projects of the early days of the Soviet Union have been described as 
both instrumental for the industrialisation of the country as well as imaginative (Vaingurt, 
2013: 5). They thereby resonate well with movements in Russian literature, which sought to 
discover the true spirit of the Russian soul by making a Montesquieu-inspired assumption that 
the climatic conditions of the country somehow resonate in the national character – in this 
case allegedly Nordic qualities like courage, manliness, and bravery as well as social and 
technical progress (Nilsson, 1987: 128ff.). All of these traits are themes that contemporary 
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nationalists evoke in discourses as well as policy proposals concerning the Arctic (Laruelle, 
2014: 39). They help us see that Arctic politics is a cultural project that is emotionally 
charged. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 A	geopoetic	perspective	does	not	claim	to	predict	future	developments.	But	it	greatly	helps	to	understand	contemporary	developments.	It	is	in	this	light	that	the	article	explored	the	conundrum	of	Arctic	politics.	It	focused	on	Russia	as	Russian	Arctic	politics	has	received	most	attention	by	non-Russian	commentators,	politicians	and	scholars.	With	a	view	to	the	broader	debate	on	geopolitics,	geopoetics	is	able	to	show	how	states	rely	on	cognitive-emotional	resources	in	light	of	which	particular	policies	become	plausible,	which	is	not	to	say	that	they	follow	a	strategic	path	(Miskimmon,	O’Loughlin	&	Ruselle,	2013)	as	the	flag-planting	incident	may	have	been	primarily	a	private	incentive	that	was	integrated	into	state	policy	post	facto.	But	geopoetics	investigates	the	cultural	resources	on	the	basis	of	which	state	action	becomes	plausible.	As	far	as	such	actual	policies	are	concerned,	given	the	effects	of	climate	change,	at	first	glance	the	attempt	to	secure	access	to	resources	as	well	as	territory	seems	sensible.	Yet	in	light	of	the	uncertainty	of	return	to	investments	due	to	the	climatic	conditions,	accessibility	of	resource	and	potential	use	of	seaways,	this	seems	less	to	be	the	case.	Also,	widespread	cooperation	among	Arctic	states	contradicts	the	assumption	of	conflictual	relations.	However,	from	a	geopoetic	perspective	it	is	possible	to	find	rational	grounds	and	motivations	for	current	practices.	When	we	consider	that	the	three	topoi	of	the	heroic	explorer,	the	conquest	and	dominance	of	nature,	and	the	use	of	technology	are	a	key	component	of	Russian	culture,	investments	in	infrastructure	along	the	Northern	Sea	Route	are	identitarian	projects	at	least	as	much	as	they	are	potentially	ones	of	wealth	and	survival.	They	resonate	with	a	theme	of	greatness	that	originated	during	the	1920s	and	following	decades.	Militarisation	makes	sense	from	this	perspective,	too,	as	it	is	not	just	a	geostrategic	tool	but	also	a	reminder	of	one’s	standing	and	achievements.	Being	able	to	overcome	the	adversities	of	nature	is	a	successful	test	of	character	for	both	men	(sic)	and	machines.	Through	their	cross-references,	the	topoi	establish	a	utopian	aspiration	that	make	the	Arctic	intelligible	and	particular	policies	appear	plausible.	The	observation	that	the	Arctic	matters	emotionally	should	be	borne	in	mind	when	commenting	on	the	rationality	of	Russian	Arctic	policy.	
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